Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf

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A Formal Model of Train Control with AI-based Obstacle Detection

RSSR'2023, Berlin

Jan Gruteser, David Geleßus, Michael Leuschel, **Jan Roßbach**, **Fabian Vu**

12.10.2023



Motivation

- AI becomes more and more important - e.g. autonomous railway systems
- Hard to verify with classical approaches like formal methods
- Goals/Challenges:
  - Verification & Certification of autonomous railway systems
  - Study impact of AI failures
  - Establish effective counter-measures

Measures towards certification

for AI-based obstacle detection

1



Case Study


Perception System
AI
Certificate Checker
Image
Camera
Steering System
1
Obstacle Sign Signal

Idea 1: Formal B Model

Study impact of AI for behavior of overall system



Formal Model: DEMO



Formal Model



Requirements (abbreviated):

- **Mission Order**: Drive along route - recognize all objects correctly
- **REC1-5**: Perception system must recognize all objects better than humans
- **SAF1-5**: When all objects are recognized correctly - there are no accidents
- **PROP1**: Safety-critical situations shall occur less frequently than with humans
- **PROP2**: Probability of achieving Mission Order shall better than with humans

Validation and Verification

- **Mission Order**
  - validated by traces with different variations for correct/incorrect/non-detection
  - evaluate impact of AI flaws

- **SAF1-5** - validated by LTL model checking - on reduced models

- **PROP1 and PROP2**
  - validated by simulation + hypothesis testing (artificial values for probabilities)
  - estimate likelihood of accidents

- **REC1-5 - certificate checking**; hard to verify with formal methods

Idea 2: Certified Control

Runtime Monitoring/Verification of AI Object Detection



Origin of “Certified Control”

VIRTUAL SEMINAR SERIES

Johns Hopkins Institute for Assured Autonomy and the Department of Computer Science

Present

Certified Control For Autonomous Driving

May 20, 2021 | 11:00 am–Noon
Click here to access this virtual event
<http://bit.ly/Daniel-Jackson>
Password: 351307

Dr. Daniel Jackson
MIT
Professor of Computer Science

https://iaa.jhu.edu/event/iaa-seminar-series-daniel-jackson-mit/

Certified Control



- Main perception and control subsystems provide a **certificate**
- Certificate is checked by a verified certificate checker (trusted base)
- Allows for verification of perception system properties, without AI verification
- Do we need an entirely new kind of AI? Not always!
- We developed a prototype for one specific use case using only existing Models

Idea 2: Certified Control

Implement and evaluate it in the context of our case study

Bild

KI

Output

Certificate

YOLO v8 Model trained for shunting signs

Kamera

1

Hindernis

Certificate Checker

OpenCV based feature detection

OK

Steering System

Certificate = formally verifiable explanation

Erroneous classification detected by checker:



Signal Sh2
Protective STOP

Correct classification rejected by checker:

the certificate
checker may
also reject
correct classifications



Certified Control: Challenges/Problems

- Not a proof of correct classification results
- Gain Accuracy at the cost of Recall (Trade off depends on the exact implementation)
- Individual Solution for each safety property required => expensive
- Does not address non detections (false negatives)

Solutions - if sign is not detected by AI:
1. provide location of signals/signs - go into a safe mode - when no sign detected where expected,
2. or accept AI can make errors - conduct a probabilistic analysis (SimB)

Conclusion

- Tooling with **ProB**
- Validation:
  - Check individual scenarios - evaluate impact of AI flaws
  - Run simulations with various assumptions - estimate likelihood of accidents
- Verification:
  - Model checking – on reduced models
  - Formal proof still challenging
  - Certificate checking for perception system





Models are available at:

https://github.com/hhu-stups/kilok_shunting_model

Thank you for your attention!

APPENDIX

KI-LOK Formal Model

- Formal **B** system **model** of
  - Deterministic steering system of shunting movements
  - Environment (points, signals, derailers, obstacles)
  - AI: correct/false/non-detection of objects



Side-note:
Industrial Usage of B and Event-B







Software
(30% of CBTC systems worldwide use B software)

Data & Config. Validation

System Specification & Executable Model



ProB running in real-time animating a **formal B model** of the **Hybrid-Level 3** principles developed by a team from the University of Düsseldorf and Thales with support from ClearSy

System Analysis & Safety Case


Rangierfahrt_KI_1_1.mch - Rangierfahrt_Project - ProB 2.0
Operationen
RF_MoveLokBackwards(frnt=B347a, prev=B347a, back=B347a, new_front=B347a, new_back
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ENV_StartMovePoint(Block=B347a, N1=B347b, N2=B855a)
ENV_EndMovePoint(Block, N1, N2)
ENV_ActivateDerailer(B1=B347b, B2=B347c)
ENV_ActivateDerailer(B1=B855a, B2=B855b)
ENV_DeactivateDerailer(B1, B2)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=91)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=92)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=93)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=94)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=95)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=96)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=97)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=98)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=99)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347b, pos=0)
ENV_RemoveBrakeShoe_Front(B, pos)
ENV_SwitchSignalToSh0(B1=B347a, B2=B855a)
ENV_SwitchSignalToSh1(B1, B2)
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VIS_DetectDisappearedStopReason_Front(reason)
Möglicherweise mehr - MAX_OPERATIONS erreicht
Animation
Nachspielen
Symbolisch
Testfallgenerierung
Status
Name
Schritte
[TR1] Mission_Order 40
[TR10] Mission_Order10 11
[TR11] Mission_Order11 15
[TR12] Mission_Order12 12
[TR13] Mission_Order13 11
[TR14] Mission_Order14 12
[TR15] Mission_Order15 16
[TR2] Mission_Order2 41
[TR3] Mission_Order3 41
Alles ist OK
Zustandsansicht
Bearbeiten
Zustand filtern
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[∈] ENV_next ∈ ENV_BLOCKS ⤔ ENV_BLOCKS true
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[∈] ENV_brake_shoes ∈ ENV_BLOCKS ⇸ ℤ true
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[∀] ∀s1·(s1 ∈ ENV_SIGNALS ⇒ ∀s2·(s2 ∈ ENV_SIGNALS ... true
Visualisierung
VisB
Zustandsvisualisierung
Visualisierung aktualisiert.
Sperrsignal HP0
Weiche W2
855a
347b
Gleissperre
855b
347c
Person
Waggon C55
Lok Vorwärtsfahrt (1x)
Lok Vorwärtsfahrt (10x)
Lok Rückwärtsfahrt (1x)
Lok Rückwärtsfahrt (10x)
Interaktive Konsole
Statistik (Zustände 47 von 2.103)
Überprüfungen
Projekt
Maschinen
Status
Präferenzen
Projekt
definitions
definitions.def
Environment
Environment.mch
Vision
Vision.mch
Control
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Rangierfahrt.mch
Rangierfahrt_KI
Rangierfahrt_KI.ref
Rangierfahrt_KI_1_1
Rangierfahrt_KI_1_1.mch
Rangierfahrt_KI_1_2a
Rangierfahrt_KI_1_2a.mch
Rangierfahrt_KI_1_2b
Rangierfahrt_KI_1_2b.mch
Rangierfahrt_KI_Random_Topology
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Verlauf (Zustand 13 von 40)
Position
Transition
11 VIS_DetectCorrectSignal_Front(B1=B347a, B2=B855a)
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
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ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=4)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=5)
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ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=7)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=8)
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Sperrsignal HP0
Weiche W2
855a
347b
Gleissperre
Platziere Hemmschuh
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Rangierfahrt.mch
Rangierfahrt_KI
Rangierfahrt_KI.ref
Rangierfahrt_KI_1_1
Rangierfahrt_KI_1_1.mch
Rangierfahrt_KI_1_2a
Rangierfahrt_KI_1_2a.mch
Rangierfahrt_KI_1_2b
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25 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855a, nxt=B855b, back=B855a, new_front=B855b, new...
26 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855b, nxt=B855b, back=B855a, new_front=B855b, new...
27 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855b, nxt=B855b, back=B855a, new_front=B855b, new...
28 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855b, nxt=B855b, back=B855b, new_front=B855b, new...
29 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855b, nxt=B855b, back=B855b, new_front=B855b, new...
30 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855b, nxt=B855b, back=B855b, new_front=B855b, new...
31 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855b, nxt=B855b, back=B855b, new_front=B855b, new...


Rangierfahrt_KI_1_1.mch - Rangierfahrt_Project - ProB 2.0
Operationen
RF_MoveLokBackwards(frnt=B855a, prev=B347a, back=B855a, new_front=B347a, new_back
RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855a, nxt=B855b, back=B855a, new_front=B855a, new_back=B
ENV_StartMovePoint(Block=B347a, N1=B347b, N2=B855a)
ENV_EndMovePoint(Block, N1, N2)
ENV_ActivateDerailer(B1=B347b, B2=B347c)
ENV_ActivateDerailer(B1=B855a, B2=B855b)
ENV_DeactivateDerailer(B1, B2)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=0)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=1)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=2)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=3)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=4)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=5)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=6)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=7)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=8)
ENV_PlaceBrakeShoe_Front(B=B347a, pos=9)
ENV_RemoveBrakeShoe_Front(B, pos)
ENV_SwitchSignalToSh0(B1, B2)
ENV_SwitchSignalToSh1(B1, B2)
VIS_DetectCorrectObject_Front(reason=wagon)
VIS_DetectDisappearedStopReason_Front(reason)
Möglicherweise mehr - MAX_OPERATIONS erreicht
Animation
Nachspielen
Symbolisch
Testfallgenerierung
Status
Name
Schritte
[TR1] Mission_Order 40
[TR10] Mission_Order10 11
[TR11] Mission_Order11 15
[TR12] Mission_Order12 12
[TR13] Mission_Order13 11
[TR14] Mission_Order14 12
[TR15] Mission_Order15 16
[TR2] Mission_Order2 41
[TR3] Mission_Order3 41
Alles ist OK
Zustandsansicht
Bearbeiten
Zustand filtern
Name
VARIABLES
CONSTANTS
SETS
INVARIANT true
[=] dom(ENV_occ) = ENV_OBJECTS true
[⊆] ENV_next ⊆ ENV_TRK true
[∈] ENV_next ∈ ENV_BLOCKS ⤔ ENV_BLOCKS true
[finite] closure1(ENV_next) ∈ FIN(closure1(ENV_next)) true
[finite] closure1(ENV_next⁻¹) ∈ FIN(closure1(ENV_next⁻¹)) true
[∀] ∀(o,b1,b2)·(o ↦ b1 ∈ ENV_occ ∧ o ↦ b2 ∈ ENV_occ ∧ ... true
[⊆] ENV_active_derailers ⊆ ENV_DERAILERS true
[∀] ∀(b1,b2)·(b1 ↦ b2 ∈ ENV_active_derailers ∧ lok ↦ b1 ∈... true
[∈] ENV_brake_shoes ∈ ENV_BLOCKS ⇸ ℤ true
[∈] ENV_signal_states ∈ ENV_SIGNALS → ENV_SIGNAL... true
[∀] ∀s1·(s1 ∈ ENV_SIGNALS ⇒ ∀s2·(s2 ∈ ENV_SIGNALS ... true
Visualisierung
VisB
Zustandsvisualisierung
Visualisierung aktualisiert.
Sperrsignal HP0
Weiche W2
Gleissperre
Platziere Hemmschuh
Lok Vorwärtsfahrt (1x)
Lok Vorwärtsfahrt (10x)
Lok Rückwärtsfahrt (1x)
Lok Rückwärtsfahrt (10x)
Person
Waggon C55
Interaktive Konsole
Statistik (Zustände 47 von 2.103)
Überprüfungen
Projekt
Maschinen
Status
Präferenzen
Projekt
definitions
definitions.def
Environment
Environment.mch
Vision
Vision.mch
Control
Control.mch
Rangierfahrt
Rangierfahrt.mch
Rangierfahrt_KI
Rangierfahrt_KI.ref
Rangierfahrt_KI_1_1
Rangierfahrt_KI_1_1.mch
Rangierfahrt_KI_1_2a
Rangierfahrt_KI_1_2a.mch
Rangierfahrt_KI_1_2b
Rangierfahrt_KI_1_2b.mch
Rangierfahrt_KI_Random_Topology
Rangierfahrt_KI_Random_Topology.mch
Verlauf (Zustand 22 von 40)
Position
Transition
11 VIS_DetectCorrectSignal_Front(B1=B347a, B2=B855a)
12 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B347a, nxt=B855a, back=B347a, new_front=B347a, new...
13 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B347a, nxt=B855a, back=B347a, new_front=B347a, new...
14 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B347a, nxt=B855a, back=B347a, new_front=B855a, new...
15 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855a, nxt=B855b, back=B347a, new_front=B855a, new...
16 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855a, nxt=B855b, back=B347a, new_front=B855a, new...
17 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855a, nxt=B855b, back=B347a, new_front=B855a, new...
18 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855a, nxt=B855b, back=B855a, new_front=B855a, new...
19 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855a, nxt=B855b, back=B855a, new_front=B855a, new...
20 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855a, nxt=B855b, back=B855a, new_front=B855a, new...
21 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855a, nxt=B855b, back=B855a, new_front=B855a, new...
22 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855a, nxt=B855b, back=B855a, new_front=B855a, ...
23 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855a, nxt=B855b, back=B855a, new_front=B855a, new...
24 VIS_DetectCorrectSignal_Front(B1=B855a, B2=B855b)
25 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855a, nxt=B855b, back=B855a, new_front=B855b, new...
26 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855b, nxt=B855b, back=B855a, new_front=B855b, new...
27 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855b, nxt=B855b, back=B855a, new_front=B855b, new...
28 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855b, nxt=B855b, back=B855b, new_front=B855b, new...
29 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855b, nxt=B855b, back=B855b, new_front=B855b, new...
30 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855b, nxt=B855b, back=B855b, new_front=B855b, new...
31 RF_MoveLokForwards(frnt=B855b, nxt=B855b, back=B855b, new_front=B855b, new...

Approaches in this Work

- Certified Control - for V&V of perception system
- Formal Methods - for V&V of steering system

Machine Hierarchy



Mission Order

Drive from the current position on track 347 to position B on track 855.
Position B is defined as wagon C55’s position (QR code).
Approach the wagon to the clutch position.
Recognise all field elements and people.
The task for the system: Recognise the described field elements (points, derailers, brake shoes) and signals reliably.

Mission Order

1. Drive from the current position on track 347a to the stop signal and point
2. Recognise stop signal and point position
3. Enter 855a and drive to the derailer
4. Recognise derailer
5. Enter 855b and approach wagon to the clutch position
6. Recognise the person and the wagon

Steps (2), (4) and (6) must recognise field elements or people correctly, otherwise, the Mission Order might not be achieved.

Mission Order

- Validation by 24 traces with different variations:
  - Neither wagon nor person recognised correctly — leads to collision with both
  - Person recognised correctly, but not wagon — leads to collision with wagon
  - Active derailer not recognised correctly — leads to the train entering a section where collision is possible
  - Neither stop signal nor moving point position recognised correctly — leads to the train derailing
  - Point position recognised correctly, but not stop signal — leads to the train entering a section where collision is possible

Safety Properties: SAF1 – SAF5

SAF1-5: When point positions, stop signals, derailers, and obstacles are recognised correctly, the train must not enter a safety-critical state (train derailing, train entering a blocked session, or collision with an obstacle).

Validation by LTL Formula:

G({“train moves forwards” ⇒
Y (“control unit updates decision to move train forwards” ∧
“train detected all signals correctly” ∧
“train detected points correctly”∧
“train detected obstacles correctly” ∧
“train detected track correctly”})
⇒ G({“train does not reach safety-critical situation”})

Model Checking

– CD = Correct Detection, WS = Wrong Signals, WP = Wrong Detection of Points, WP_DT = Update detected track

Table 2: Model Checking Results for Selected Reduced Models

Model	Operations	Variables/ Constants	States	Transitions	Time (min)	Memory (GB)
CD	13	34	269 153	2 240 046	6.8	1.3
+ WS	14	34	480 409	5 403 158	12.3	2.6
+ WP	15	34	807 001	10 733 462	23.4	4.8
+ WP_DT	15	34	>16 785 959	>185 250 252	>530	>80
complete	22	46	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Simulation with SimB

Table 1: Overview of all probabilities for AI's perception system with distances to field element or obstacle, CD = Correct Detection, WD = Wrong Detection, I = Ignore

Signal	Distance	0-10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70	71-80	81-90	91-100	101-110
	CD	99.9%	99.9%	64.9%	49.9%	39.9%	29.9%	19.9%	14.9%	9.9%	4.9%	0.0%
	WD	0.01%	0.01%	3.51%	5.01%	6.01%	7.01%	8.01%	8.51%	9.01%	9.51%	0.0%
	I	0.09%	0.09%	31.59%	45.09%	54.09%	63.09%	72.09%	76.59%	81.09%	85.59%	100.00%
Point Positioning	Distance	0-10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70	71-80	81-90	91-100	101-110
	CD	99.9%	99.9%	54.9%	34.9%	19.9%	9.9%	4.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	WD	0.01%	0.01%	4.51%	6.51%	8.01%	9.01%	9.41%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	I	0.09%	0.09%	40.59%	58.59%	72.09%	81.09%	85.59%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Derailer	Distance	0-10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70	71-80	81-90	91-100	101-110
	CD	99.9%	99.9%	64.9%	49.9%	39.9%	29.9%	19.9%	14.9%	9.9%	4.9%	0.0%
	WD	0.01%	0.01%	3.51%	5.01%	6.01%	7.01%	8.01%	8.51%	9.01%	9.51%	0.0%
	I	0.09%	0.09%	31.59%	45.09%	54.09%	63.09%	72.09%	76.59%	81.09%	85.59%	100.00%
Wagon	Distance	0-10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70	71-80	81-90	91-100	101-110
	CD	99.9%	99.9%	64.9%	49.9%	39.9%	29.9%	24.9%	19.9%	14.9%	9.9%	4.9%
	WD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	I	0.1%	0.1%	35.1%	50.1%	60.1%	70.1%	75.1%	80.1%	85.1%	90.1%	95.1%
Person	Distance	0-10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70	71-80	81-90	91-100	101-110
	CD	99.9%	99.9%	64.9%	49.9%	39.9%	29.9%	24.9%	19.9%	14.9%	9.9%	4.9%
	WD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	I	0.1%	0.1%	35.1%	50.1%	60.1%	70.1%	75.1%	80.1%	85.1%	90.1%	95.1%

Probabilistic Property: PROP1

PROP1: When driving along the route from 347a to 855b, safety-critical situations (train derailing, train entering a blocked section, collision with wagon or person) must occur less frequently with KI-LOK than with humans

Validation by Simulation:

SIM(*ending*: “train reaches the end of 855b” ∨
“train reaches the end of 347c” ∨
“train reaches a safety-critical situation”
prop: “train never reaches a safety-critical situation”
check: HYPOTHESIS
procedure: LEFT_TAILED
probability: 0.999
α: 0.001)

Probabilistic Property: PROP2

PROP2: The probability of achieving the mission order by KI-LOK must be as good as humans

Validation by Simulation:

SIM(*ending*: “train reaches the end of 855b” ∨
“train reaches the end of 347c” ∨
“train reaches a safety-critical situation”
prop: “train reaches the end of 855b safely”
check: HYPOTHESIS
procedure: LEFT_TAILED
probability: 0.999
α: 0.001)

Validation and Verification: Challenges/Problems

- Validation:
  - Traces only cover parts of state space
  - Probabilities for simulation

- Verification:
  - Model checking struggles with state space explosion
  - Proving very hard on our model
  - Perception System (**REC1-REC5**) - hard to verify with formal methods - use **certificate checking**

Sign Detection + Certificate Checker

Our Implementation

- Various Yolo v8 models trained for shunting signs
- Certificate: bounding box and class of detected sign
- Certificate checker
  - hand-written using OpenCV
  - feature detection + rules



Signal Sh0
STOP!



Signal Sh2
Protective STOP



Signal Sh1
Shunting permitted

etc.

Related Work

- New standardisation approaches, e.g., UL4600 standard
- Several approaches for verifying neural networks - do not scale for our properties and network
- Several railway systems: Abrial’s interlocking model, CBTC, Hybrid Level 3, ... - especially older railway systems - do not cover AI aspect